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Abstract
We present a new approach to runtime veriﬁcation that utilizes classical statistical techniques such as
Monte Carlo simulation, hypothesis testing, and conﬁdence interval estimation. Our algorithm, MCM, uses
sampling-policy automata to vary its sampling rate dynamically as a function of the current conﬁdence it has
in the correctness of the deployed system. We implemented MCM within the Aristotle tool environment, an
extensible, GCC-based architecture for instrumenting C programs for the purpose of runtime monitoring.
For a case study involving the dynamic allocation and deallocation of objects in the Linux kernel, our
experimental results show that Aristotle reduces the runtime overhead due to monitoring, which is initially
high when conﬁdence is low, to levels low enough to be acceptable in the long term as conﬁdence in the
monitored system grows.
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1 Introduction
In previous work [7], we presented the MC2 algorithm for Monte Carlo Model Check-
ing. Given a (ﬁnite-state) reactive program P , a temporal property ϕ, and param-
eters  and δ, MC2 samples up to M random executions of P , where M is a function
of  and δ. Should a sample execution reveal a counter-example, MC2 answers false to
the model-checking problem P |= ϕ. Otherwise, it decides with conﬁdence 1−δ and
error margin , that P indeed satisﬁes ϕ. Typically the number M of executions
that MC2 samples is much smaller than the actual number of executions of P . More-
over, each execution sampled starts in an initial state of P , and terminates after a
ﬁnite number of execution steps, when a cycle in the state space of P is reached.
In this paper, we show how the technique of Monte Carlo model checking can
be extended to the problem of Monte Carlo monitoring and runtime veriﬁcation.
Our resulting algorithm, MCM, can be seen as a runtime adaptation of MC2, one whose
dynamic behavior is deﬁned by sampling-policy automata (SPA). Such automata
encode strategies for dynamically varying MCM’s sampling rate as a function of the
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current conﬁdence in the monitored system’s correctness. A sampling-policy au-
tomaton may specify that when a counterexample is detected at runtime, the sam-
pling rate should be increased since MCM’s conﬁdence in the monitored system is lower.
Conversely, if after M samples the system is counterexample-free, the sampling rate
may be reduced since MCM’s conﬁdence in the monitored system is greater.
The two key beneﬁts derived from an SPA-based approach to runtime monitoring
are the following:
• As conﬁdence in the deployed system grows, the sampling rate decreases, thereby
mitigating the overhead typically associated with long-term runtime monitoring.
• Because the sampling rate is automatically increased when the monitored system
begins to exhibit erroneous behavior (due either to internal malfunction or exter-
nal malevolence), Monte Carlo monitoring dynamically adapts to internal mode
switches and to changes in the deployed system’s operating environment.
A key issue addressed in our extension of Monte Carlo model checking to the
runtime setting is: What constitutes an adequate notion of a sample? In the case of
Monte Carlo runtime veriﬁcation, the monitored program is already deployed, and
restarting it after each sample to return the system to an initial state is not a prac-
tical option. Given that every reactive system is essentially a sense-process-actuate
loop, in this paper we propose weaker notions of initial state that are suﬃcient for
the purpose of dynamic sampling. One such notion pertains to the manipulation
of instances of dynamic types: Java classes, dynamic data structures in C, etc. In
this setting, a sample commences in the program state immediately preceding the
allocation of an object o and terminates in the program state immediately following
the deallocation of o, with these two states being considered equivalent with respect
to o.
To illustrate this notion of runtime sampling, we consider the problem of veri-
fying the safe use of reference counts (RCs) in the Linux virtual ﬁle system (VFS).
The VFS is an abstraction layer that permits a variety of separately-developed ﬁle
systems to share caches and present a uniform interface to other kernel subsystems
and the user. Shared objects in the VFS have RCs so that the degree of sharing of
a particular object can be measured. Objects are placed in the reusable pool when
their RCs go to zero, objects with low RCs can be swapped out, but objects with
high RCs should remain in main memory. Proper use of RCs is essential to avoid
serious correctness and performance problems for all ﬁle systems.
To apply Monte Carlo runtime monitoring to this problem, we have deﬁned
Real Time Linear Temporal Logic formulas that collectively specify what it means
for RCs to be correctly manipulated by the VFS. We further implemented the MCM
algorithm within the Aristotle environment for Monte Carlo monitoring. Aristotle
provide a highly extensible, GCC-based architecture for instrumenting C programs
for the purposes of runtime monitoring. Aristotle realizes this architecture via a
simple modiﬁcation of the GNU C compiler (GCC) that allows one to load an
arbitrary number of plug-ins dynamically and invoke code from those plug-ins at
the tree-optimization phase of compilation.
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Using a very simple sampling policy, our results show that Aristotle brings run-
time overhead, which is initially very high when conﬁdence is low, down to long-term
acceptable levels. For example, a benchmark designed to highlight overheads under
worst-case conditions exhibited a 10x initial slowdown; 11 minutes into the run,
however, we achieved 99.999% conﬁdence that the error rate for both classes of
reference counts was below one in 105. At this point, monitoring for that class was
reduced, leaving an overhead of only 33% from other monitoring.
In addition to reference counts, Aristotle currently provides Monte Carlo moni-
toring support for the correct manipulation of pointer variables (bounds checking),
lock-based synchronization primitives, and memory allocation library calls. Due to
its extensible architecture based on plug-ins, support for other system features can
be easily added.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our system
design. Section 3 presents our Monte Carlo runtime monitoring algorithm. Sec-
tion 4 details the Aristotle design and implementation. Section 5 gives an example
application of Aristotle, and Section 6 discusses related work. Section 7 contains
our concluding remarks and directions for future work.
2 Aristotle Design Overview
Figure 1 depicts the various stages of operation for Aristotle as it processes a sys-
tem’s source code. A modiﬁed version of the GNU C compiler (GCC) parses the
source code, invoking an instrumenting plug-in to process the control ﬂow graph
for each function. The instrumenting plug-in inserts calls to veriﬁcation code at
each point where an event occurs that could aﬀect the property being checked. The
veriﬁcation code is part of a runtime monitor, which maintains auxiliary runtime
data used for property veriﬁcation and is bound into the software at link time.
The runtime monitor interacts with the conﬁdence engine, which implements a
sampling policy based on our Monte Carlo runtime monitoring algorithm (described
in Section 3). The conﬁdence engine maintains a conﬁdence level for the properties
being checked and may implement a sampling policy automaton to regulate the
instrumentation or perform other actions. This regulation can be based on changes
in the conﬁdence level and could respond to other events in the system, such as the
execution of rarely-used code paths.
3 Monte Carlo Monitoring
In this section, we present our MCM algorithm for Monte Carlo monitoring and run-
time veriﬁcation. We ﬁrst present MCM in the context of monitoring the correct
manipulation of reference counts (RCs) in the Linux virtual ﬁle system (VFS). RCs
are used throughout the Linux kernel, not only to prevent premature deallocation
of objects, but also to allow diﬀerent subsystems to indicate interest in an object
without knowing about each other’s internals. Safe use of reference counts is an
important obligation of all kernel subsystems. We then consider generalizations of
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Fig. 1. Architectural overview of the Aristotle system.
(stI) ∀o : C. G o.rc ≥ 0 RC values are always non-negative.
(trI) ∀o : C. G |o′.rc− o.rc | ≤ 1 RC values are never incremented or decre-
mented by more than 1.
(lkI) ∀o : C. G o′.rc = o.rc ⇒
XF≤T o
′.rc ≤ o.rc
A change in the value of an RC is always fol-
lowed within time T by a decrement.
Fig. 2. Reference-count correctness properties.
the algorithm to arbitrary dynamic types.
In the case of the Linux VFS, the objects of interest are dentries and inodes,
which the VFS uses to maintain information about ﬁle names and data blocks,
respectively. The VFS maintains a static pool of these objects and uses RCs for
allocation and deallocation purposes: a free object has an RC of zero and may
be allocated to a process; an object with a positive RC is considered in-use and
may only be returned to the free pool when the state of the RC returns to zero.
Additionally, an object with a high reference count is less likely to be swapped out
to disk.
To apply Monte Carlo runtime monitoring to this problem, we ﬁrst deﬁne the
properties of interest. These are formally deﬁned in Figure 2.
Each of these properties is formalized using Real-Time Linear Temporal Logic [2],
where G, F and X are unary temporal operators. G requires the sub-formula over
which it operates to be true Globally (in all states of an execution), F requires it to
hold Finally (in some eventual state of an execution), and X requires it to hold neXt
(in the next state of an execution). Also, an unprimed variable refers to its value in
the current state and the primed version refers to its value in the next state. Each
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property uses universal quantiﬁcation over all instances o of a dynamic type C.
The ﬁrst property is a state invariant (stI) while the second property is a transi-
tion invariant (trI). The third property is a leak invariant (lkI) that is intended to
capture the requirement that the RC of an actively used object eventually returns
to zero. It is expressed as a time-bounded liveness constraint, with time bound T .
Since each of these properties can be proved false by examining a ﬁnite execution,
they are safety properties, and one can therefore construct a deterministic ﬁnite
automaton (DFA) A that recognizes violating executions [10,16]. The synchronous
composition (product) CA of C with A is constructed by instrumenting C with
A such that C violates the property in question iﬀ an object o of type C can
synchronize with A so as to lead A to an accepting state.
We view an object o of type C as executing in a closed system consisting of
the OS and its environment. We assume that the OS is deterministic but the
environment is a (possibly evolving) Markov chain; i.e., its transitions may have
associated probabilities. As a consequence, CA is also a Markov chain. Formally, a
Markov chain M = (X,E, p, p0) consists of a set X of states; a set E ⊆ X ×X of
transitions (edges); an assignment of positive transition probabilities p(x, y) to all
transitions (x, y) so that for each state x, Σy∈Xp(x, y) = 1; and an initial probability
distribution p0 on the states such that Σx∈Xp0(x) = 1. A ﬁnite trajectory of M is
the ﬁnite sequence of states x = x0, x1, . . . , xn, such that for all i, (xi, xi+1) ∈ E and
p(xi, xi+1) > 0. The probability of a ﬁnite trajectory x = x0, x1, . . . , xn is deﬁned
as PM (x) = p0(x0)p(x0, x1) · · · p(xn−1, xn).
Each trajectory of CA corresponds to an object execution. The more objects
displaying the same execution behavior, the higher the probability of the associated
trajectory. Hence, although the probabilities of CA are not explicitly given, they
can be learned via runtime monitoring.
Assuming that kernel-level objects have ﬁnite lifetimes (with the possible ex-
ception of objects such as the root ﬁle-system directory entry), and that state is
dependent on the object’s history, CA is actually a Markov tree, since no object
goes backward in time. The leaves of CA fall into two categories: (i) violation-free
executions of objects of type C which are deallocated after their RCs return to zero,
and (ii) executions violating property stI, trI, or lkI.
Thus, a trajectory in CA can be viewed as an object execution from its birth to
its death or to an error state representing a property violation. We consider such
a trajectory to be a Bernoulli random variable Z such that Z = 0 if the object
terminated normally, and Z = 1 otherwise. Further, let pZ be the probability that
Z = 1 and qZ = pZ − 1 be the probability that Z = 0. The question then becomes:
how many random samples of Z must one take to either ﬁnd a property violation or
to conclude with conﬁdence ratio δ and error margin  that no such violation exists?
To answer this question, we rely, as we did in the case of Monte Carlo model
checking, on the techniques of acceptance sampling and conﬁdence interval estima-
tion. We ﬁrst deﬁne the geometric random variable X, with parameter pZ , whose
value is the number of independent trials required until success, i.e., until Z = 1.
The probability mass function of X is p(N) = P[X = N ] = qN−1Z pZ , and the
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cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X is
F (N) = P[X ≤ N ] =
∑
n≤N
p(n) = 1− qNZ
Requiring that F (N)=1−δ for conﬁdence ratio δ yields:
N =
ln(δ)
ln(1− pZ)
which provides the number N of attempts needed to ﬁnd a property violation with
probability 1−δ.
In our case, pZ is unknown. However, given error margin  and assuming that
pZ ≥ , we obtain that
M =
ln(δ)
ln(1− )
≥ N =
ln(δ)
ln(1− pZ)
and therefore that P[X ≤ M ] ≥ P[X ≤ N ] = 1− δ. Summarizing, for M = ln(δ)ln(1−)
we have:
pZ ≥  ⇒ P[X ≤ M ] ≥ 1− δ(1)
Inequality 1 gives us the minimal number of attempts M needed to achieve
success with conﬁdence ratio δ under the assumption that pZ ≥ .
The standard way of discharging such an assumption is to use statistical hypoth-
esis testing [12]. We deﬁne the null hypothesis H0 as the assumption that pZ ≥ .
Rewriting inequality 1 with respect to H0 we obtain:
P[X ≤ M |H0] ≥ 1− δ(2)
We now perform M trials. If no counterexample is found, i.e., if X > M , then
we reject H0. This may introduce a type-I error: H0 may be true even though
we did not ﬁnd a counterexample. However, the probability of making this error
is bounded by δ; this is shown in inequality 3 which is obtained by taking the
complement of X ≤ M in inequality 2:
P[X > M |H0] < δ(3)
With the above framework in place, we now present MCM, our Monte Carlo Mon-
itoring algorithm. MCM, whose pseudo-code is given in Figure 3, utilizes DFA A to
monitor properties stI, trI, and lkI, while keeping track of the number of samples
taken.
input: , δ, C, t, d;
global: tn, cn;
tn = cn = ln(δ)/ln(1-); set(timeout,d);
when (created(o:C) && flip())
if (tn > 0) { tn--; o.to=t; o.rc=0};
when (destroyed(o:C)){
cn--; if (cn = 0) monitoring stop;}
when (monitored(o:C) && modified(o.rc)){
if (o′.rc < 0 | | |o′.rc-o.rc| > 1) safety stop; /* stI, trI */
if (o.rc-o′.rc == 1) o.to = t;}
when (timeout(d))
for each (monitored(o:C)){
o.to--; if (o.to == 0) leak stop;} /* lkI */
Fig. 3. The MCM algorithm.
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MCM consists of an initialization part, which sets the target (tn) and current
(cn) number of samples, and a monitoring part, derived from the properties to
be veriﬁed. The latter is a state machine whose transitions (when statements) are
triggered either by actions taken by objects of type C or by a kernel timer thread.
The timer thread wakes up every d time units, and the time window used to sample
object executions is t∗d, where t and d are inputs to the algorithm. When an object
o:C is created and the random boolean variable flip() is true, the target number
of samples is decremented. The random variable flip() represents one throw of
a multi-sided, unweighted coin with one labeled side, and returns true precisely
when the labeled side comes up. If enough objects have been sampled (tn=0), no
further object is monitored. For a monitored object, its reference count rc and
timeout interval to are appropriately initialized. When an object is destroyed, cn
is decremented. If the target number of samples was reached (cn=0), the required
level of conﬁdence is achieved and monitoring can be disabled. When the RC of a
monitored object is altered, we check for a violation of safety properties stI or trI,
stopping execution if one has occurred. If an object’s RC is decremented, we reset
its timeout interval; moreover, should its RC reach zero, the object is destroyed or
reclaimed. When the timer thread awakens, we adjust the timeout interval of all
monitored objects. If an object’s timeout interval has expired, leak invariant lkI
has been violated and the algorithm halts.
Due to the random variable flip(), MCM does not monitor every instance o of
type C. Rather, it uses a sampling-policy automaton to determine the rate at which
instances of C are sampled. For example, consider the n-state policy automaton
PAn that, in state k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, MCM will only sample o if flip() returns true for
a 2k-sided coin. Moreover, PAn makes a transition from state k to k + 1 mod n
after exactly M samples. Hence, after M samples (without detecting an error) the
algorithm uses a 4-sided coin, after 2M samples an 8-sided coin, etc. For a given
error margin , the associated conﬁdence ratio δ will then be (1 − )M , (1 − )2M ,
(1−)3M and so on. PAn also makes a transition from state k to j, where j < k, when
an undesirable event occurs, such as a counterexample, or perhaps an execution of
as yet unexecuted code. Sampling policies such as the one encoded by PAn assure
that MCM can adapt to environmental changes, and that the samples taken by MCM are
mutually independent (as n tends toward inﬁnity).
MCM is very eﬃcient in both time and space. For each random sample, it suﬃces
to store two values (old and new) of the object’s RC. Moreover, the number of
samples taken is bounded by M . That M is optimal follows from inequality 3, which
provides a tight lower bound on the number of trials needed to achieve success with
conﬁdence ratio δ and lower bound  on pZ .
Our kernel-level implementation of MCM is such that if a violating trajectory is
observed during monitoring, it is usually the case that a suﬃcient amount of diag-
nostic information can be gleaned from the instrumentation to pinpoint the root
cause of the error. For example, if an object’s RC becomes negative, the application
that executed the method that led to this event can be determined.
In another example, if the object’s RC fails to return to zero and a leak is
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suspected, diagnostic information can be attained by identifying the object’s con-
taining type. Suppose the object is an inode; we can use this information to locate
the corresponding ﬁle name and link it back to the oﬀending application.
The MCM algorithm of Figure 3 can be extended by expanding the class of correct-
ness properties supported by the algorithm. The third and fourth when branches of
the algorithm correspond to safety or bounded-liveness checks, respectively. Hence,
the MCM algorithm can be generalized in the obvious way, to allow the treatment of
arbitrary safety and bounded-liveness properties for any reactive program involving
dynamic types. For example, in addition to reference counts, Aristotle currently
provides Monte Carlo monitoring support for the correct manipulation of pointer
variables (bounds checking), lock synchronization primitives, and memory alloca-
tion library calls. Due to its extensible, plug-in-oriented architecture, support for
other properties can easily be added.
4 Implementation
In Aristotle, we instrument a program with monitoring code using a modiﬁed ver-
sion of the GNU C compiler (GCC), version 4. We modiﬁed the compiler to load
an arbitrary number of plug-ins and invoke code from those plug-ins at the tree-
optimization phase of a compilation. At that point in the compilation, the abstract
syntax tree has been translated into the GIMPLE intermediate representation [6],
which includes syntactic, control-ﬂow, and type information. A plug-in is invoked
that can use the GCC APIs to inspect each function body in turn and add or
remove statements. The plug-in can even invoke other GCC passes to extract in-
formation; for example, one plug-in we developed for bounds checking uses the
reference-analysis pass to obtain a list of all variables used by a function.
Our use of GCC as the basis for Aristotle oﬀers several advantages. First, it
can be used to instrument any software that compiles with GCC. Prior static-
checking and meta-compilation projects have used lightweight compilers [4,8] that
do not support all of the language extensions and features of GCC. Many of these
extensions are used by open-source software, particularly the Linux kernel. Second,
the modular architecture of Aristotle allows programmers to instrument source-code
without actually changing it. Third, Aristotle users can take advantage of GCC’s
library of optimizations and ability to generate code for many architectures. Adding
GCC support for plug-ins is very simple; we added a command-line option to load
a plug-in and changed the way GCC is built to expose GCC’s internal APIs to
plug-ins.
The information collected at the instrumented locations in the system’s source
code is used by runtime monitors. A runtime monitor is a static library, linked
with the system at compile time. The runtime monitor contains checking code
which veriﬁes that each detected event satisﬁes all safety properties; furthermore,
it may spawn threads that periodically verify that all bounded liveness properties
hold. The monitor interfaces with the conﬁdence engine, reporting rule violations
and regulating its operation according to the conﬁdence engine’s instructions, which
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reﬂect the operation of a sampling-policy automaton. Finally, it may also perform
other operations, like verbose logging and network-based error reporting, which vary
from application to application.
5 Case Study: The Linux VFS
The Linux Virtual File System (VFS) is an interface layer that manages installed
ﬁle systems and storage media. Its function is to provide a uniform interface to
the user and to other kernel subsystems, so that data on mass storage devices can
be accessed in a consistent manner. To accomplish this, the VFS maintains uniﬁed
caches of information about ﬁle names and data blocks: the dentry and inode caches,
respectively. The entries in these caches are shared by all ﬁle systems. The VFS
and ﬁle systems use reference counts to ensure that entries are not reused without
a ﬁle system’s knowledge and to prioritize highly-referenced objects for retention in
main memory as opposed to being swapped out.
The fact that these caches are shared by diﬀerent ﬁle systems, implemented
by diﬀerent authors and of varying degrees of maturity, introduces the potential for
system resource leaks and faults arising from misuse of cached objects. For example,
a misbehaving ﬁle system may prevent a storage device from being safely removed
because the reference count for an object stored to that device was not safely reduced
to zero. Worse, a misbehaving ﬁle system could hamper the performance of other
ﬁle systems by failing to decrement the reference counts of cache data structures.
Using the Aristotle framework, we developed a tool that monitors reference
counts in the Linux VFS. As described in Section 3, we enforced a state invariant
(stI), a transition invariant (trI), and a leak invariant (lkI).
The plug-in for this case study instruments every point in the source code at
which a reference count was modiﬁed. Because we had access to type information,
we were able to classify reference counts for dentry and inode objects. Whenever
it is invoked, the runtime monitor checks the operation to ensure that the safety
properties hold. Additionally, if the operation is a decrement, the monitor updates
a timestamp for that reference count, which is maintained in an auxiliary data
structure. A separate thread periodically traverses the data structure to verify that
all reference counts have been decremented more recently than time interval T .
Additionally, all checked operations are optionally logged to disk.
The conﬁdence engine maintains separate conﬁdence levels for dentry and inode
reference counts using our Monte Carlo model checking algorithm. For clarity, we
demonstrate the system with a sampling policy automaton that disables checking
when a 99.999% conﬁdence level has been reached that the error rate for that
reference counter category is less than 1 in 105 samples. As discussed in Section 3,
a sample is deﬁned as the lifetime of a cached object, that is, the period when the
object’s reference counter is nonzero. Other sampling policies, such as ﬂipping an n-
sided coin where n increases as conﬁdence increases to determine whether to sample
a given object, allow more ﬁne-grained trade-oﬀs of performance vs. conﬁdence;
additionally, it may be advisable to increase the sampling rate as the environment
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Fig. 4. Overhead reduction as conﬁdence increases.
changes.
Figure 4(a) shows the performance overhead of the system with logging and
checking enabled, logging disabled but checking enabled, and no instrumentation,
under a micro-benchmark designed to exercise the ﬁle system caches. In each run,
the micro-benchmark creates a tree of directories, does a depth-ﬁrst traversal of
that tree, and deletes the tree. Because directories are being created and deleted,
on-disk data is being manipulated, causing creation and deletion of objects in the
inode cache. Additionally, the directory traversal stress-tests the dentry cache. We
observe an initial 10x overhead as both dentry and inode reference counts are being
monitored and all accesses are being logged. After ﬁve runs, which take six minutes
in total, dentry conﬁdence reaches the target, and overhead falls to a factor of
three. Finally, ﬁve minutes later, after eleven runs, overhead drops to 33% when
inode conﬁdence reaches the target. The remaining overhead is a characteristic of
our prototype; we expect optimization to reduce it signiﬁcantly.
Figure 4(b) shows the eﬀects under a benchmark that puts less stress on the
ﬁle system. Compiling the GNU tar utility involves less cache activity than the
micro-benchmark described above, so the overheads from monitoring are lower;
however, it also takes longer for conﬁdence to reach the target. Initial overhead
with logging was 46%. After ten runs, or eleven minutes, this overhead dropped to
14% as dentry conﬁdence reached the target. Forty minutes later, at the 55th run,
overheads dropped to 11% as inode conﬁdence reached its target as well.
6 Related Work
Runtime veriﬁcation is the subject of much recent research [3,14,15]. Our work com-
bines and takes these concepts one step further, detecting instrumentation points at
compile time and managing itself autonomously at runtime using statistically-driven
sampling policies. Other related work includes metacompilation [8] and ESP [11],
which extend compilers with static checkers to ﬁnd violations of system-speciﬁc
properties; and the model-checking eﬀorts directed at network protocols [5,13], ﬁle
systems [17], and device drivers [1].
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Chilimbi and Hauswirth [9] have implemented a sampling-based technique for
detecting memory leaks in programs. They maintain a timestamp with each memory
object and a sampling rate with each basic block of code. Each time a basic block
b makes a reference to an object o, o’s timestamp is updated and b’s sampling rate
is decreased. No attempt is made to quantify the conﬁdence level and error margin
introduced by this technique.
7 Conclusions
We have presented the MCM algorithm for Monte Carlo monitoring and runtime veriﬁ-
cation, which uses sampling-policy automata to vary its sampling rate dynamically
as a function of the current conﬁdence in the monitored system’s correctness. We
implemented MCM within the Aristotle tool environment, an extensible, GCC-based
architecture for instrumenting C programs for the purposes of runtime monitoring.
Aristotle realizes this architecture via a simple modiﬁcation of GCC that allows one
to load an arbitrary number of plug-ins dynamically and invoke code from those
plug-ins at the tree-optimization phase of compilation. Our experimental results
show that Aristotle reduces the runtime overhead due to monitoring, which is ini-
tially high when conﬁdence is low, to long-term acceptable levels as conﬁdence in
the deployed system grows.
As future work, we are developing an instrumentation-speciﬁcation language to
facilitate plug-in construction and insertion into GCC. Additionally, we are investi-
gating the integration of auxiliary information, such as code coverage, into sampling
policies. This would allow, for example, instrumentation to be increased when a
rarely-used section of code is executed.
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